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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of thought and speech are the essence of the American 
experiment. That the First Amendment protects both offensive thought and 
speech is the price of democracy.1 This Article addresses Masterpiece 
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Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a case decided by 
the United States Supreme Court in June of 2018.2  
Part I provides the facts and procedural history of the case. Part II 
provides background to bring Masterpiece Cakeshop into historical 
perspective. Part III summarizes the opinions of the Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”), the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (the 
“Commission”), the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the United States 
Supreme Court. Part IV argues that ordering Masterpiece Cakeshop and 
its owner, Jack Phillips, to create a wedding cake to celebrate a same-sex 
marriage violates the First Amendment by forcing a person to carry a 
compelled message and engaging in viewpoint restriction. This legal 
conclusion does not indicate any sympathy whatsoever for the behavior or 
views of Mr. Phillips but quite the opposite. Dura lex, sed lex: the law is 
hard, but it is the law. Part V concludes that, per Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis, the best way to kill an offensive idea is not to make it illegal but 
to expose it and crush it under the weight of its own ignorance. 
I. FACTS OF MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. V. COLORADO CIVIL 
 RIGHTS COMMISSION 
Although the parties dispute the facts, this Article assumes the facts as 
set out in the Colorado Court of Appeals opinion and will therefore 
directly quote to avoid any confusion:  
In July 2012, Craig and Mullins visited Masterpiece, a bakery in 
Lakewood, Colorado, and requested that Phillips design and 
create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding. Phillips 
declined, telling them that he does not create wedding cakes for 
same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs, but advising 
Craig and Mullins that he would be happy to make and sell them 
any other baked goods. Craig and Mullins promptly left 
Masterpiece without discussing with Phillips any details of their 
wedding cake. The following day, Craig’s mother, Deborah 
Munn, called Phillips, who advised her that Masterpiece did not 
make wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his 
religious beliefs and because Colorado did not recognize same-
sex marriages.3  
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This account is consistent with the facts that Justice Alito established in 
oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, in the following exchange 
with Frederick Yarger, the Solicitor General for the State of Colorado: 
MR. YARGER: Well, Your Honor, again, it—it—the decision by 
this bakery was it wouldn’t sell any product— 
 
JUSTICE ALITO: No, that's not right, Mr. Yarger. It is a 
disturbing feature of your brief because this case was decided on 
summary judgment, and, therefore, you have to view the facts in 
the light most favorable to Mr. Phillips. And the only thing he 
admitted and what was said in the undisputed—the list of 
undisputed facts was he would not create—he was very careful to 
use the word “create.” Is that wrong?  
 
MR. YARGER: That’s not incorrect, Your Honor.4 
After the above described events, Craig and Mullins filed charges of 
discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division (the “Division”), 
alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado 
Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”), §§ 24-34-301–804, C.R.S. 2014.5 
The Division found probable cause to credit the allegations of 
discrimination.6 Craig and Mullins then filed a formal complaint with the 
Office of Administrative Courts, alleging that Masterpiece discriminated 
against them in a place of public accommodation because of their sexual 
orientation in violation of C.R.S. § 24-34-601(2), which states: 
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or 
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a 
group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation 
or, directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or 
mail any written, electronic, or printed communication, notice, or 
advertisement that indicates that the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
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of a place of public accommodation will be refused, withheld from, 
or denied an individual or that an individual’s patronage or presence 
at a place of public accommodation is unwelcome, objectionable, 
unacceptable, or undesirable because of disability, race, creed, color, 
sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry.7 
The ALJ granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, which the 
Commission affirmed.8 Upon review, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
affirmed the ALJ and Commission decisions.9 On June 4, 2018, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mr. Phillips’s right to free exercise 
of religion had been violated.10  
II. BACKGROUND 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the First 
Amendment “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all. . . . [These rights are] complementary components of 
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”11 If, at the time of 
its founding, there was a single organizing principal on which the new 
country, its Declaration of Independence, and its Constitution relied, it was 
this concept of the individual freedom of the mind. It is worth examining, 
in Justice Harlan’s famous phrase, “the traditions from which [America] 
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.”12 The profound 
lack of freedom of the mind in Europe in the centuries prior to adopting 
the Constitution was a primary tradition from which this country broke, 
and that break is imperative to contemplate when addressing First 
Amendment questions. Addressing this lack of freedom of the mind, the 
author has previously written: 
In England, James I and Charles I carried on the persecution of 
Catholics that had started the moment Henry VIII withdrew from 
the church.13 The Test Act provided that no Catholic could hold 
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office.14 James I had Unitarians burned alive for doubting the 
divinity of Christ.15 William Prynne had his ears cut off for 
publishing Histriomatrix, a series of blasphemous plays.16 Jews 
had not been allowed in the country since the time of Edward I.17 
After the ascension of Oliver Cromwell in 1642, the control of the 
Puritans substituted itself for the control of the Church of 
England.18 Gambling and betting were outlawed, and adultery was 
punishable by death.19 Drinking, swearing, walking on the 
Sabbath, and athletic sports were also banned.20  
 
If things improved under William and the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, it was not as much as is popularly believed.21 The Toleration 
Act was passed in 1689, but tolerance did not extend to Catholics, 
Unitarians, Jews, and Pagans.22 Dissenters were not allowed to 
attend university and could not seek elective office.23 In 1697, the 
strengthened legislature passed a law against blasphemy 
mandating prison for criticism of the church.24 In 1699, laws were 
passed imposing life imprisonment for saying mass, and rewards 
were waiting for those who turned in violators.25 A person not 
taking a loyalty oath to the Church of England lost the right to 
purchase or devise land.26 Even Locke’s Epistola de Tolerantia, 
urging tolerance as a principle, excluded atheists, Moslems, 
Catholics and Unitarians.27  
 
The sacred world was no more forgiving than the secular. The 
philosopher Spinoza’s parents, expelled from Spain and Portugal, found 
                                                                                                             
 14. WILL & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV 291 (Simon & Schuster 
1963) [hereinafter DURANT I]. 
 15. WILL & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 140 (Simon & 
Schuster 1961) [hereinafter DURANT II]. 
 16. Id. at 193. 
 17. See CHURCHILL, supra note 13, at 315.  
 18. Id. at 311. 
 19. Id. at 311–12. 
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 21. DURANT I, supra note 14, at 301–02. 
 22. Id. at 301, 589. 
 23. Id. at 301–02. 
 24. Id. at 302. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 589–90. 




refuge in Holland.28 There, Spinoza’s beliefs were tolerated by the Dutch 
government—but not by the church, which excommunicated Spinoza.29 
Similarly, on February 26, 1616, Galileo was forced to appear before 
Urban VIII to recant his Copernican theories published in De 
Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium.30 On pain of death, he spoke: “With 
a sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, curse, and detest the said errors 
and heresies . . . .”31  
The situation in 1791 was essentially the same; George the III was 
King of England, Leopold II was the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 
Frederick Wilhelm II was King of Prussia, and Louis XVI was—for a short 
while more—King of France.32 Freedom of thought and speech for their 
subjects were not priorities.33 As Voltaire said, “Eloquence is writing 
something and not ending up in the Bastille”—which Voltaire did.34 
Voltaire and his fellow philosophes were to aid in supplying the 
traditions from which America developed. The Founding Fathers heavily 
relied on the influence of the French Enlightenment, with its emphasis on 
freedom of the mind, to challenge ancient dogmas. The historians Will and 
Ariel Durant wrote:  
[I]t was noted that Washington, Franklin, and Jefferson had been 
molded to free thought by the philosophes. Through those 
American sons of the French Enlightenment, republican theories 
graduated into a government victorious in arms, recognized by a 
French King, and proceeding to establish a constitution indebted 
in some measure to Montesquieu.35   
This concept of individual freedom of the mind manifested in several 
ways: Jefferson’s Statute of Religious Freedom; the Declaration of 
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Independence; and the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.36 
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State.”37 Individual freedom of the mind has thus been, with its 
complimentary components of the “right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all,”38 a cornerstone in the foundation of this 
nation’s legal beginning. With this foundation in mind, one may now turn 
to Masterpiece. 
III. CRAIG V. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, INC. 
After Mr. Phillips declined to create a wedding cake for Mr. Craig and 
Mr. Mullins, Craig and Mullins began legal proceedings. The ALJ granted 
summary judgment in their favor,39 and the Commission subsequently 
entered a: 
final cease and desist order required that Masterpiece (1) take 
remedial measures, including comprehensive staff training and 
alteration to the company’s policies to ensure compliance with 
CADA; and (2) file quarterly compliance reports for two years 
with the Division describing the remedial measures taken to 
comply with CADA and documenting all patrons who are denied 
service and the reasons for the denial.40  
Masterpiece and Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The 
parties stipulated that Masterpiece Cake, Ltd. is a place of public 
accommodation and that the plaintiffs were a protected class per C.R.S. § 
24-34-601—although the Court of Appeals had to address the issue that 
the plaintiffs initially cited the wrong section, the court dismissed that 
argument.41 The essence of the arguments, and the Court of Appeals’ 
holding, was whether Masterpiece refused to bake a wedding cake because 
of the plaintiffs’ identities, both sides stipulating that would violate 
CADA, or because of the message that the cake would convey: 
                                                                                                             
 36. See generally Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom of 1786, in GARRY 
WILLS, UNDER GOD 362 (1990); Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776); U.S. 
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Masterpiece asserts that it did not decline to make Craig’s and 
Mullins’ wedding cake “because of” their sexual orientation. It 
argues that it does not object to or refuse to serve patrons because 
of their sexual orientation, and that it assured Craig and Mullins 
that it would design and create any other bakery product for them, 
just not a wedding cake. Masterpiece asserts that its decision was 
solely “because of” Craig’s and Mullins’ intended conduct—
entering into marriage with a same-sex partner—and the 
celebratory message about same-sex marriage that baking a 
wedding cake would convey. Therefore, because its refusal to serve 
Craig and Mullins was not “because of” their sexual orientation, 
Masterpiece contends that it did not violate CADA. We disagree.42 
The Court of Appeals, using the facts assumed in the opinion, further 
held that the willingness of Mr. Phillips to sell other products to the couple 
was irrelevant as to whether refusing to bake a wedding cake violated 
CADA:  
We reject Masterpiece’s related argument that its willingness to 
sell birthday cakes, cookies, and other non-wedding cake products 
to gay and lesbian customers establishes that it did not violate 
CADA. Masterpiece’s potential compliance with CADA in this 
respect does not permit it to refuse services to Craig and Mullins 
that it otherwise offers to the general public.43 
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission’s order did not 
constitute a compelled message: 
Masterpiece contends that the Commission’s cease and desist order 
compels speech in violation of the First Amendment by requiring it 
to create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. Masterpiece argues 
that wedding cakes inherently convey a celebratory message about 
marriage and, therefore, the Commission’s order unconstitutionally 
compels it to convey a celebratory message about same-sex marriage 
in conflict with its religious beliefs. We disagree. We conclude that 
the Commission’s order merely requires that Masterpiece not 
discriminate against potential customers in violation of CADA and 
that such conduct, even if compelled by the government, is not 
sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protections.44 
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In June of 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
lower courts violated Mr. Phillips’s right of free exercise of religion.45 It 
was an opinion that caused significant controversy, as it was seen in many 
quarters as a setback for progress in this country’s continuing expansion 
of its obligation to provide equal protection under the law to groups 
previously excluded.46 Specifically, numerous people wondered how 
Justice Kennedy, who had penned the soaring rhetoric granting the right 
to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, could come down on the 
opposite side in Masterpiece.47 Yet, the legal question was entirely 
different; the Court decided Obergefell under a Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis and Masterpiece under a First Amendment analysis. The question 
is, which clause of the First Amendment? As noted, the Court decided the 
case primarily under the Free Exercise Clause.48 This Article argues that 
the Freedom of Speech Clause is what lies at the heart of Masterpiece. 
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
A Freedom of Speech Clause analysis yields a three-part inquiry: (1) 
is a wedding cake “speech”; (2) if so, was Mr. Phillips compelled to be 
associated with speech constituting a message not of his choosing; and (3) 
did the Division neutrally apply the law? This analysis suggests that a 
wedding cake is speech, that Mr. Phillips was forced to carry a message 
he did not want, and that the Division was not neutral in its application. 
This violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
A. A Celebratory Wedding Cake is Speech 
Baking a wedding cake is a message, even if the parties had not yet 
discussed the specific words and decorations. Although there is no 
universal norm for what makes something look like a wedding cake, a 
general societal consensus exists; otherwise the couple would have asked 
for a cake, not a wedding cake. A baker of wedding cakes has not done his 
job if a cake is not recognizable as a wedding cake. As the Court of 
Appeals noted, the request was for a wedding cake that would “celebrate” 
their marriage—in other words, requesting a message.49 
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The cases on which the Court of Appeals relied to show that conduct 
and identity are inseparable miss the crucial point of the plaintiffs’ 
requested celebratory wedding cake.50 In these cases, the laws or policies 
did not relate to creating a message, but to homosexual conduct. Being in 
a relationship is not speech or a message. By words or decorations, 
however, a wedding cake communicates a message and therefore is 
speech. 
At oral argument, a significant amount of time was devoted to the 
issue of whether the same words necessarily conveyed the same message. 
Consider the following exchange, admittedly a trap, between Justice Alito 
and Solicitor General Yarger: 
JUSTICE ALITO: And we have a history of—in the questioning 
by—of Petitioner’s counsel, we explored the line between speech 
and non-speech, but as I understand your position, it would be the 
same if what was involved here were words. Am I wrong? If he 
would put a particular form of words on a wedding cake, on a cake 
for one customer, he has to put the same form of words, the same 
exact words on a wedding cake for any other customer, regardless 
of the context?  
 
MR. YARGER: That’s right, just as he would have to sell a Happy 
Birthday cake to a member of the Jewish faith or an African-
                                                                                                             
 50. The Court of Appeals based its disagreement on several U.S. Supreme 
Court cases: 
 However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that such 
distinctions are generally inappropriate. See Christian Legal Soc'y 
Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 
661, 689, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 177 L.Ed.2d 838 (2010) (“[The Christian 
Legal Society] contends that it does not exclude individuals because 
of sexual orientation, but rather ‘on the basis of a conjunction of 
conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong.’ . . . Our 
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in 
this context.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 
2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made 
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration *281 in and of itself 
is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.”); 
id. at 583, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct 
targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being 
homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is . . . directed 
toward gay persons as a class.”). 
Id. at 280–81. 






JUSTICE ALITO: So if someone came in and said: I want a cake 
for—to celebrate our wedding anniversary, and I want it to say 
November 9, the best day in history, okay, sells them a cake. 
Somebody else comes in, wants exactly the same words on the 
cake, he says: Oh, is this your anniversary? He says: No, we're 
going to have a party to celebrate Kristallnacht. He would have to 
do that?  
 
MR. YARGER: Your Honor, that wouldn’t be— 
 
JUSTICE ALITO: It is the same words.52  
Although the words are the same, it is not the same message. Speech 
is not just the words that one speaks or writes. The words themselves are 
only the starting point. The intent and context change words into the 
speech contemplated by the First Amendment. This point is perhaps most 
ably stated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his comments on the famous case 
of Raffles v. Wichelhaus,53 wherein two individuals formed a contract for 
a shipment of cotton between Bombay and Liverpool on a ship called the 
Peerless; yet, unknown to both parties, there were two ships of the same 
name: 
It is commonly said that such a contract is void, because of mutual 
mistake as to the subject-matter, and because therefore the parties 
did not consent to the same thing. But this way of putting it seems 
to me misleading. The law has nothing to do with the actual state 
of the parties’ minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by 
externals, and judge parties by their conduct. If there had been but 
one “Peerless,” and the defendant had said “Peerless” by mistake, 
meaning “Peri,” he would have been bound. The true ground of 
the decision was not that each party meant a different thing from 
the other, as is implied by the explanation which has been 
mentioned, but that each said a different thing.54 
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Justices Holmes and Alito, and Mr. Yarger, rather reluctantly, agreed 
across the decades that the same words do not necessarily convey the same 
messages. A wedding cake, especially when customers ask for it to be 
celebratory, is a message. The meaning of the message changes with the 
context. 
B. Mr. Phillips Was Forced to Carry a Compelled Message Against His 
Wishes 
If one acknowledges that creating a wedding cake is in fact a message, 
the next question is whether a person can be forced to be associated with 
a message against his wishes. The Supreme Court has unequivocally 
answered that question “no.”55 Mr. Phillips did not wish to be associated 
with a message celebrating a same-sex wedding. Regardless of what one 
thinks of Mr. Phillips’s wish, the Supreme Court has held on numerous 
occasions that an individual does in fact have the right to decline an 
unwanted association.56 The following three cases, spanning more than 
half a century, indicate the consistency with which the Court has answered 
this in the negative. 
First, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a school could force a 
student to stand and pledge allegiance to the flag.57 The eloquent and 
learned Justice Jackson, who would soon be the Chief American 
Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, wrote for the Court holding that such 
forced behavior violated the First Amendment: 
[T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a 
belief and an attitude of mind. . . . [T]he power of compulsion is 
invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a 
flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would 
justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the 
compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights 
which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it 
open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not on 
his mind. . . . 
 
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
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subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s rights 
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom 
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not 
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections 
. . . . Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of 
some end thought essential to their time and country have been 
waged by many good as well as by evil men . . . . Ultimate futility 
of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such 
effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a 
disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious 
and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, 
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. 
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of 
thought achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. It seems 
trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment was designed 
to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings.58 
 In 1977, the issue of compelled association of a message was once 
again before the Court, and once again, the Court held it unconstitutional.59 
In Wooley v. Maynard, a citizen of New Hampshire did not wish to have 
the state motto “Live Free or Die” on his license plate.60 The Court held 
that forcing the plaintiff to carry this message “invades the sphere of 
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to 
reserve from all official control.”61  
Similarly, in 1995, the Supreme Court decided the case of Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.62 Hurley 
involved a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people wishing to carry a 
banner of its own in a privately organized St. Patrick’s Day parade.63 The 
state courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, holding: “The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts 
may require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the 
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marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to 
convey. We hold that such a mandate violates the First Amendment.”64 
The facts of Hurley had a great deal in common with the facts of 
Masterpiece. In both cases there was a state law forbidding discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation of a person in a place of public 
accommodation. In Hurley, the parade was found a place of public 
accommodation, as was the bakery in Masterpiece. In Hurley, the 
plaintiffs wished to carry a banner with a message relating to same-sex 
couples; in Masterpiece, the plaintiffs wanted the defendant to create a 
cake with a message celebrating same-sex marriage. In Hurley, the 
plaintiffs could have joined the parade, just not imposed their message; in 
Masterpiece—assuming the facts as adopted by the Colorado Supreme 
Court—the defendant would have served the plaintiffs, just not created a 
special message. Arguably in both cases, the actions of the defendants 
were based on ignorance and prejudice. Yet the Court in Hurley held: “But 
this use of the State’s power violates the fundamental rule of protection 
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”65 
Justice Brandeis defined “the right to be let alone” as “the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”66 
This is why “[t]he freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment 
includes the ‘right to refrain from speaking’ and prohibits the government 
from telling people what they must say.”67  
C. The Division Engaged in Viewpoint Restriction in its Application of 
CADA 
Viewpoint restriction occurs when the government takes sides in a 
question of free speech. To the extent that CADA, as the Division applies 
it, allows business owners to not create a message they deem offensive, it 
is redundant; the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
already guarantees that. To the extent that the Commission forces a 
business to create a message with which the owner of the business does 
not agree, but the Commission does not find offensive, the Commission is 
violating the First Amendment at its core; it is having the government 
choose sides in the content of a message and committing viewpoint 
restrictions. 
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In three cases, each case with the same plaintiff, Mr. Jack, making the 
same request of three different bakeries, the Commission carved out 
exceptions to CADA and allowed the baker in question to refuse to make 
a product with a specific message, because the Division implicitly agreed 
that the message was offensive.  
The first case, Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc.,68 is in a sense the mirror 
opposite of Masterpiece. In 2014, Mr. Jack visited Le Bakery Sensual, and 
asked the owner, Mr. Spotz, for an estimate on two different cakes, each 
bearing an anti-homosexual message. The first was two groomsmen with 
a red X over them; the second was a quote from Leviticus 18:2, stating, 
“Homosexuality is a detestable sin.” Mr. Spotz declined to make the cakes 
because he considered them hateful.  
Mr. Jack filed a complaint with the Division, claiming, like Craig and 
Mullins, a violation of C.R.S. § 24-34-601. The Commission held that Mr. 
Jack was in fact a member of a protected class based on his creed, 
Christianity.69 The Commission, however, held that the respondent did not 
have to make the requested messages, holding that the respondent’s feeling 
that that requested Biblical verses were “hateful” was a sufficient basis to 
refuse to create the cakes conveying the messages in question.70 
In the second case, Jack v. Azucar Bakery,71 the same plaintiff was 
denied the same cake. The Division held that this refusal was acceptable: 
“Instead, the Respondent’s denial was based on the explicit message that 
the Charging Party wished to include on the cakes, which the Respondent 
deemed as discriminatory.”72 Again, the Division was allowing refusal of 
making a cake because the baker felt that the message was discriminatory. 
By using the word “message,” the Division undercut its own rationale in 
Masterpiece that the issue was not about a message—it was. 
The third case with the same plaintiff had similar facts and holdings. 
In Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd.,73 the Division once again held that the baker had 
the right to refuse to make the cake requested with the same messages, 
based on the offensive nature of the message.74 The Division noted that 
Gateaux, Ltd. previously refused to bake cakes with other offensive 
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messages, including “eat me,” “ya old bitch,” and what Gateaux referred 
to as “naughty images,” on the basis that the imagery and messages were 
not what the Respondent wished to represent in its products.75 The pattern 
that emerges is that the Division allowed the various bakers to refuse to 
include messages that the owners feel are offensive. 
Yet, that is not how the Division ruled in Masterpiece. Mr. Phillips 
refused to create a cake that would in some way convey, by its very 
existence, a message that he found offensive. The Division, the ALJ, the 
Commission, and the Court of Appeals, however, held in Masterpiece that 
such a refusal violated CADA. Thus, it issued an order requiring that 
Masterpiece complete the following: 
(1) take remedial measures, including comprehensive staff 
training and alteration to the company’s policies to ensure 
compliance with CADA; and (2) file quarterly compliance reports 
for two years with the Division describing the remedial measures 
taken to comply with CADA and documenting all patrons who are 
denied service and the reasons for the denial.76  
Implicitly, the Division, the ALJ, the Commission, and the Court of 
Appeals took the stance that if they agreed that the message was offensive, 
the baker need not carry it, but if they did not agree, the baker must. 
The Division and the Court of Appeals engaged in viewpoint 
restriction in holding whether the cake was a message. The Court of 
Appeals held: “The Division found that the bakeries did not refuse the 
patron’s request because of his creed, but rather because of the offensive 
nature of the requested message.”77 Yet the Court of Appeals in the same 
case held that Mr. Phillips’s cake would not contain a message:  
 
Masterpiece contends that the Commission’s cease and desist 
order compels speech in violation of the First Amendment by 
requiring it to create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. 
Masterpiece argues that wedding cakes inherently convey a 
celebratory message about marriage and, therefore, the 
Commission’s order unconstitutionally compels it to convey a 
celebratory message about same-sex marriage in conflict with its 
religious beliefs.  
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We disagree. We conclude that the Commission’s order merely 
requires that Masterpiece not discriminate against potential 
customers in violation of CADA and that such conduct, even if 
compelled by the government, is not sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment protections.78 
 
The Court of Appeals held, in other words, that the three bakers in the 
cases of Mr. Jack would be delivering a message constituting speech, but 
in Masterpiece, a wedding cake with the opposite message was “not 
sufficiently expressive” to receive First Amendment protection. Whether 
Mr. Jack and Mr. Phillips were acting on bigoted motives is irrelevant. 
The Division and the Colorado Court of Appeals engaged in further 
viewpoint restriction in holding that that no one would confuse the 
message of the cake as being a message from Mr. Phillips himself:  
By selling a wedding cake to a same-sex couple, Masterpiece does 
not necessarily lead an observer to conclude that the bakery 
supports its customer’s conduct. The public has no way of 
knowing the reasons supporting Masterpiece’s decision to serve 
or decline to serve a same-sex couple. Someone observing that a 
commercial bakery created a wedding cake for a straight couple 
or that it did not create one for a gay couple would have no way 
of deciphering whether the bakery’s conduct took place because 
of its views on same-sex marriage or for some other reason.79  
This point is not well taken. The Division held that three bakeries that 
refused to sell to Mr. Jack were not required to do so because the message 
was offensive. If there were no chance that the message might have been 
perceived as coming from the respective bakers, then any intellectual and 
legal foundation for the holding in those three cases instantly fails.  
 Finally, and most crucially, the Division and the Colorado Court of 
Appeals engaged in viewpoint restriction in their application of the law by 
allowing three bakers to refuse to make cakes with a message they found 
to be offensive, but not the fourth, Mr. Phillips. Justice Alito pointed this 
out at oral argument: 
JUSTICE ALITO: One thing that’s disturbing about the record 
here, in addition to the statement made, the statement that Justice 
Kennedy read, which was not disavowed at the time by any other 
member of the Commission, is what appears to be a practice of 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 283.  
 79. Id. at 287.  




discriminatory treatment based on viewpoint. The—the 
Commission had before it the example of three complaints filed 
by an individual whose creed includes the traditional Judeo-
Christian opposition to same-sex marriage, and he requested cakes 
that expressed that point of view, and those—there were bakers 
who said no, we won’t do that because it is offensive. And the 
Commission said: That’s okay. It’s okay for a baker who supports 
same-sex marriage to refuse to create a cake with a message that 
is opposed to same-sex marriage. But when the tables are turned 
and you have the baker who opposes same-sex marriage, that 
baker may be compelled to create a cake that expresses approval 
of same-sex marriage.80 
A government actor taking sides, or viewpoint restrictions, is precisely 
what the First Amendment forbids. Indeed, “[t]he Court generally treats 
restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm 
violation of the First Amendment.”81 This treatment is true even when 
those sides are at opposite ends of the moral spectrum. Justice Scalia noted 
this prohibition on viewpoint restriction in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul:  
The First Amendment generally prevents government from 
proscribing [or compelling] speech, or even expressive conduct, 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based 
regulations are presumptively invalid . . . . [I]n its practical 
operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere 
content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination . . . . St. 
Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight 
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensberry rules.82 
In Collin v. Smith, Judge Pell, on behalf of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit wrote, “Above all else, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 83 
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V. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
This is not the end of story, but the beginning. As Justice Brandeis 
famously wrote, “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman.”84 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., sounded 
a similar note in his dissent in Abrams v. United States:  
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out.  
 
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every 
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based 
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our 
system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant against 
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and 
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently 
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing 
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country.85  
Brandeis wrote to Holmes, “I join you heartily—and gratefully.”86 
These two Justices experienced a journey after the more repressive 
holdings like Schenk during this critical time in modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Mr. Urofsky wrote: 
Holmes met Learned Hand on a train, and the two men began a 
correspondence debating the meaning of the First Amendment. 
Hand had earlier delivered a far more speech-protective decision 
in the Masses case that libertarians had applauded . . . . Harold 
Laski arranged a meeting between Holmes and Chaffee, and the 
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justice, who had been stung by the unexpected criticism of the 
Schenk decision, listened carefully. 
 
Brandeis also learned about the suppression of speech through 
dozens of letters he received from correspondents. Felix 
Frankfurter wrote to him from Bisbee, Arizona, to describe how 
mine owners violated the civil rights of striking workers under the 
guise of patriotism. Amos Pinchot wanted Brandeis to intervene 
with the Justice Department to stop the prosecution of the editors 
of the Masses . . . . Since [Holmes] was not about to admit that he 
had been wrong only a few months earlier, Holmes went out of 
his way to explain that the clear-and-present-danger test meant 
“immediate danger” or a “clear and imminent danger,” and he 
began to pay more attention to the ideas implicit in the First 
Amendment. He undoubtedly consulted with Brandeis, who alone 
of all the members of the Court joined his dissent. In the remaining 
two speech cases of the term, Brandeis wrote the opinions, joined 
by Holmes, and in doing so moved well beyond his colleagues in 
terms of speech protectiveness.87 
The notions that “sunlight is the best disinfectant,” Holmes’ “free 
trade of ideas,” and the competition of the marketplace thus emerged, or 
rather, re-emerged. The First Amendment has come under attack before, 
most notably in the Alien and Sedition Acts signed into law by President 
John Adams. It has come under attack since then; it will again. But the 
theory that the way to kill a bad idea is not to make it illegal, but to expose 
it, is both the modern law and most consistent with the original notions of 
the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Such exposure is the answer in Masterpiece. Rather than requiring Mr. 
Phillips to carry a forced message, it is better to broadcast his 
discriminatory behavior. It is not a perfect answer; public opinion is not 
always right. But as Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “The arc of the moral 
universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”88 Courts should allow Mr. 
Phillips and his business to be crushed by the weight of his own ignorance 
as the arc bends. Such allowance is the only answer that the American 
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experience, and the Constitution, permit. Historical attempts of 
governments compelling messages have been disastrous. Decades after the 
Sistine ceiling, when the Vatican—with pressure from no lesser mortals 
than Clement VII and Paul III and after a lifetime of struggles against 
Julius II—forced Michelangelo, who greatly preferred his native Florence 
to Rome, to paint the Last Judgment of Christ, Michelangelo painted the 
entrance to Hell directly at eye level of the priest, who in the Renaissance 
would deliver the sermon with his back to the congregation thus facing the 
fresco.89 Centuries later, Joseph Stalin insisted that the composer Dimitri 
Shostakovich write symphonies that would deliver a triumphant 
message.90 The end of the fifth symphony is but one example of how 
Shostakovich tricked Stalin, sounding triumphant to lesser ears, but in 
agony to people of subtler artistic sensibilities than Stalin’s. People will 
find a way to express who they are. The only question is whether a 
government allows or forbids it. The Constitution of the United States not 
only allows it, but forbids popular opinion from removing that right. The 
Founding Fathers placed the First Amendment first with good reason: it is 
the cornerstone of the American experience. Although, as in this case, it 
protects offensive and bigoted behavior, protect that behavior it must. For 
if it does not, it has no meaning at all. 
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